However, many commentators often express their concerns in slightly more nuanced ways than the former Archbishop of Canterbury. For example, the Bishop of Bradford, Nick Baines, has commented that: "I don"t believe Christians are being persecuted. Having said that, I do think there is still a degree of religious illiteracy which is prejudiced against Christians in some circumstances". 12 Although these concerns are ironic given the increase in laws concerning religion, they are by no means unsurprising. The last decade has witnessed a clear trend towards what I have referred to as "the juridification of religion". 13 The opening years of the twenty-first century 8 [2010] EWCA Civ 880, at para. 17. 9 See para. 6 of the Witness Statement. 10 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17021831> and <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9080441/Westand-side-by-side-with-the-Pope-in-fighting-for-faith.html> 11 See the "Clearing the Ground Inquiry" Published by Christians in Parliament <http://www.eauk.org/clearingtheground/>. 12 See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/ world/2011/Jul/10/christian-mp-inquiry-religious-discrimination> 13 See R Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press, 2011) chapter 10.
religious rights cases of recent years are currently on the long road to the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg. The concern is that English courts seem to be interpreting religious rights in a very narrow, conservative and Western manner which risks leaving 
The Begum Precedent
The case of Begum attracted a great deal of media and academic comment since it concerned the wearing of Islamic dress (a jilbab) at school. However, the reasoning of the House of Lords has proved to be of more importance than its decision. The case concerned the interpretation of Article 9 ECHR, which reads:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 14 See ibid chapter 5. 15 Ibid chapter 6. 16 Ibid chapter 7. 17 See, e. community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one"s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
There are at least two rights found in Article 9(1): the absolute right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the qualified right to manifest religion or belief. This means that people can believe whatever you want but once they act on that belief then such manifestations can be limited in the circumstances prescribed in Article 9(2). If the court holds that there is interference under Article 9(1), it then moves on to discuss whether that interference was justified under Article 9(2).
In Begum the House of Lords were unanimous in their disposal of the appeal. However, their reasoning differed. Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale held that there had been an interference with Article 9(1) but that it had been justified under Article 9(2). In contrast, Lords Bingham, Hoffmann and Scott held that there had been no interference with Article 9(1). The school"s refusal to allow a pupil to wear religious dress did not interfere with that pupil"s religious and remarkably consistent body of authority which our domestic courts must take into account and which shows that interference is not easily established."
That final sentence has been quoted in several judgments since, often to support a finding that there has been no interference with the claimant"s Article 9 rights. It is that final remark that I find problematic. On my reading of Strasbourg jurisprudence to state that "interference is not easily established" is to over-state the law. This sentence has far too often been interpreted to mean that interference will not be readily established and has warranted the placing of high thresholds that need to be met before This does not mean that the first limb of the test is redundant. 35 However, the contracting out doctrine does seem to place more emphasis upon this second aspect of Lord Bingham"s rule.
Indeed, under Malik"s interpretation the word "and" in Lord Bingham"s test seems to become an "or":
"where an individual either puts themselves into a situation that restricts their religious freedom in some way, or has a choice that would allow them to change their situation in a way that allows them to exercise their religious freedom, it is assumed that there has been no interference".
36
This emphasis seems to be followed in Begum itself with considerable stress being placed upon the issue of whether she could have gone to another school. In contrast, less attention is given to the question of whether Begum voluntarily submitted to the system of norms; though wearing a headscarf at enrolment, lectures and examinations. The facts of the case were more in keeping with both the "specific situation rule" and the "contracting out doctrine" as discussed above. However, although the Court noted vaguely that "Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and does not in all cases guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated by a belief", 40 the
Court proceeded "on the assumption that the regulations in issue, which placed restrictions of place and manner on the right to wear the Islamic headscarf in universities, constituted an interference with the applicant"s right to manifest her religion. 41 In other words, the approach favoured by Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale in Begum was taken: it was held that there had been an interference with Article 9(1) it had been justified under Article 9(2). However, ironically, the way in which the majority of the House saw the fact that she could go to another school was definitive means that English law moved towards this "impossibility test". The focus on the second limb of Lord Bingham"s test meant that the emphasis was on the possibility of "contracting-out" rather than the identification of a specific situation rule.
Şahin v Turkey
This means that the rule now has general effect.
A Uniform Approach

47
A series of cases concerning school uniforms followed Begum by holding that there was no interference with Article 9 since the claimant was free to go to another school. Silber J effectively concluded that the "and" between limbs A and B should be read as if it said "or". He held that:
In R (on the application of X) v Y School
44 At para 38. 45 failing to observe that part A also needs to be met. Silber J concluded his analysis by observing:
"I have not been shown or found any decision of the European Court of Human Rights or of any English court in which it was held that there was an infringement of person's article 9 rights when he or she could without excessive difficulty manifest or practice their religion as they wished in another place or in another way. The approach in Strasbourg courts to complaints that an applicant has been unable to manifest his or her religion or belief has been to impose a high threshold before interference can be established".
56
The context of this discussion, as shown by the final sentence of the quote, seems to suggest that Silber J is regarding the terms "infringement" and "interference" to be synonymous. If this is true, his beginning statement is simply erroneous. Sahin and Williamson are just two examples of cases where it was held that there was an interference with Article 9 where the claimant could have manifested their religion elsewhere. It is true that both of those Article 9
claims failed but they did so on grounds of justification not interference. It was accepted that the manifestations came within the scope of Article 9(1) but was then held that the interference was justified under Article 9(2).
Like X v Y, the decision in R (on the Application of Playfoot (A Child) v Millais School
Governing Body 57 followed Begum in placing more emphasis on the fact that the claimant could manifest her religion easily at another school. This brings the law in line with the questioned impossibility rule found in the Jewish Liturgical case.
The decision in Playfoot concerned the wearing of a "purity ring" at school as a sign of sexual restraint and the claimant"s decision to remain a virgin until marriage because she was a Christian. Supperstone QC, sitting as a High Court judge, held that the wearing of a purity ring was not a manifestation of her religion for the purposes of Article 9 since:
56 Para 38. 57 [2007] EWHC Admin 1698.
"In my judgment the act of wearing a ring is not "intimately linked" to the belief in chastity before marriage. ... The Claimant was under no obligation, by reason of her belief, to wear the ring; nor does she suggest that she was so obliged".
58
In reaching this conclusion, Supperstone QC relied upon paragraph 32 of Lord Nicholls" speech in Williamson in which his Lordship observed:
"in deciding whether the claimants' conduct constitutes manifesting a belief in practice for the purposes of article 9 one must first identify the nature and scope of the belief.
If, as here, the belief takes the form of a perceived obligation to act in a specific way, then, in principle, doing that act pursuant to that belief is itself a manifestation of that belief in practice. In such cases the act is 'intimately linked' to the belief, in the Strasbourg phraseology".
Lord Nicholls is saying that if an action is obligatory under the religion in question then that means that it is likely that doing that action will be seen as a manifestation. 
The Rise and Fall of Religious Discrimination Law
For a time, the extension of discrimination law to specifically prohibit discrimination on grounds of religion or belief filled the gap created by Begum. 62 The only successful case concerning the wearing of religious dress at school was successful because it was argued solely on grounds of discrimination law: religious freedom was not part of the legal arguments.
63
Laws on indirect discrimination were used to circumvent the rule put forward by Lord
Bingham in Begum which meant that Article 9 had little application in the employment sphere (since employees could simply resign). In particular, a number of indirect discrimination claims about working hours and holy days were successful. 64 If the employer changed your working hours in ways which prevented you from manifesting your religion, then that constituted discrimination unless it could be shown to be justified. In Eweida the Court of Appeal held that BA"s then uniform policy which prohibited the wearing of visible religious symbols unless their wearing was mandatory did not constitute indirect discrimination. The Court held that the uniform policy did not put Christians at a particular disadvantage because there was no evidence that practising Christians considered the visible display of the cross to be a requirement of the Christian faith.
In other words, there is only religious discrimination where a believer is stopped from doing something which is obligatory in the faith in question and where their co-religionists agree that it is obligatory. This means that fringe beliefs held by a few individuals (including beliefs held by a minority of believers within a larger religious group) will be denied protection.
Eweida was followed by the Employment Tribunal decision in Chaplin v Royal Devon &
Exeter NHS Foundation Trust 67 , which concerned a nurse who wished to wear a crucifix around her neck. Despite evidence that another nurse had been asked to remove her cross and chain, 68 the Employment Tribunal held that this other nurse had not been put at a particular disadvantage since her religious views were not so strong as to lead her to refuse to comply with the policy. It was held that in order for there to be a "particular disadvantage", the disadvantage needed to be "noteworthy, peculiar or singular". interference to deal swiftly with claims. This is not to say that the "religion or belief" argument always needs to win. However, the "religion or belief" argument needs to be considered seriously and treated as being as important as other rights.
However, dismissing claims on the basis of interference is convenient. It allows judges to dismiss claims by simply applying a legal test. It is not their fault, they could claim, that the case is dismissed. They are simply following the law. And discussing the question of justification as a hypothetical obiter question means that difficult questions can be avoided.
Towards a Hierarchy of Rights
The effect of Begum was that Article 9 became moribund and although new provisions outlawing religious discrimination provided some remedy in lieu of Article 9, the case of Eweida shows that a restrictive approach has also been taken there. This has meant that religious rights are easily "trumped" by other rights. 71 This is especially true of a number of high profile cases where there has been a clash between discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and discrimination on grounds of religion. Rather than attempting to balance these rights, courts and tribunals have readily accepted that the need to eliminate discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is an answer to a charge of religious discrimination. Further, Ladele was employed in a public job and was being "required to perform a purely secular task, which was being treated as part of her job".
75
Aspects of this reasoning are questionable. 76 The argument seems one-sided. Preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is described as being of "overarching, policy significance" whilst freedom of religion is defined very narrowly. Surely the equality policy protects discrimination on grounds of religion as well as on grounds of sexual orientation.
Taken literally, the Court of Appeal in Ladele seemed to suggest that freedom of religion only included the right to hold beliefs and worship. This is not the case as the text of Article 9 makes clear. It appears that the laudable aim of preventing discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation was used to annihilate the claim of religious discrimination. Moreover, there seems to be an implicit understanding here that the workplace will be secular and that 73 The Court of Appeal also held that claims of direct discrimination on grounds of religion failed because the employer did not treat the employee unfavourably on grounds of religion. Although Ladele"s actions were on grounds of religion, their employer"s actions were not. She was treated as she was because of her refusal to perform civil partnerships not because of her religious beliefs. 74 At para 51. Dyson LJ held that this conclusion was reinforced by Article 9 of the ECHR: see paras 54-61. 75 80 He added that: "Our society is now pluralistic and largely secular. But one aspect of its pluralism is that we also now live in a multi-cultural community of many faiths. One of the paradoxes of our lives is that we live in a society which has at one and the same time become both increasingly secular but also increasingly diverse in religious affiliation" (para 38). 81 In terms of direct discrimination, the High Court held that had been no direct discrimination on grounds of religion or belief since the defendant"s treatment of the claimant had been the result of the claimant"s disapproval of same sex relationships rather than because of the claimant"s religion or belief. They seemed to interpret the reasoning in Ladele and McFarlane in this respect as a general principle: "If the defendant"s treatment is the result of the claimants" expressed antipathy, objection to, or disapproval of homosexuality and same-sex relationships it is clear, on authorities which bind us, namely the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Ladele and McFarlane, that it would not be because of their religious belief": (Para 99). 82 Para 101.
"Article 9 only provides a "qualified" right to manifest religious belief and that interferences in the sphere of employment and analogous spheres are readily found to be justified, even where the members of a particular religious group will find it difficult in practice to comply".
85
Although Munby LJ is correct to say that the right to manifest under Article 9 is one of the qualified rights under the Convention, his definition of what "qualified" seems to say that Article 9 is a very limited right. His insistence that interferences "are readily found to be justified" is particularly noteworthy given that most of the Article 9 cases have failed on grounds of interference. And the last sentence goes even further than Begum.
In sum, the pattern found in the case law seems to be as follows:
(i) Article 9 claims are failing on grounds of interference (rather than justification) due to the application of the contracting out doctrine (as distinct to the specific situation rule). This is shown in by Begum, as followed by X v Y and Playfoot.
Playfoot also suggested that only obligatory religious practices will be protected. 83 Para 101. 84 The judgment"s first discussion of Article 9 is anodyne enough, comprising simply of selected well-meaning quotes from Strasbourg cases to reach the basic conclusion that: " the Convention forbids the state to determine the validity of religious beliefs and in that respect imposes on the state a duty of what the Strasbourg court has called neutrality and impartiality" (para 48). 85 At para 102.
(ii) Although discrimination law has led to some successful cases in the context of employment (especially in relation to working hours), a restrictive approach seems to be taken in some cases to the question of disadvantage, especially in respect of ascertaining whether that disadvantage is shared by co-religionists. This is shown in particular by Eweida (which is very much in keeping with the logic of Playfoot).
(iii) A series of cases concerning religious and sexual orientation discrimination claims (Ladele and Johns v Derby City Council) suggest that the need not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation will always serve as justification to a religious discrimination claim. This seems to be the strongest evidence to date that there now exist a hierarchy of rights with religious discrimination coming below other equality strands.
However, some recent cases (and a change in stance by the Equality and Human Rights Commission) have indicated that changes may be afoot.
The Return of Article 9
A significant and so far overlooked case is the High Court decision in R on the Application of
Bashir v The Independent Adjudicator and HMP Ryehull and the Secretary of State for
Justice. 86 The case concerned a prisoner, was charged with failing to obey a lawful order outlined different rules that could be applied in relation to the collection of urine samples during 'religious festivals which involve total fasting' but these did not apply in the present case since it was not a religious festival. The Adjudicator concluded that although there is nothing to stop individuals fasting on other days, they then bear the consequences of this. At the High court, this adjudication was challenged as being, inter alia, contrary to Article 9 ECHR. Pelling QC, sitting as a High Court Judge, quashed the adjudication. He held that the circumstances required the Adjudicator to consider the applicability of Article 9, examining whether Article 9 was engaged, whether there was an interference with these rights and whether that interference had been justified under Article 9 (2). Simply considering applicability of the religious festival exception was 'a wrong approach':
88 "The reasons given by the Adjudicator do not suggest that he considered the Article 9 point at all but rather simply considered the lawfulness issue by reference to the applicability of the religious festival exception. That was a wrong approach. The circumstances plainly required the applicability of Article 9 to be considered".
89
As a result, the decision must be quashed since it could not be demonstrated that a reasonable Adjudicator correctly directing himself would have necessarily come to a similar conclusion as that reached by the Adjudicator in this case.
Unlike many of the cases, discussed above, the High Court in Bashir did not feel the need to erect any of the barriers in front of the claimant. Pelling QC held that Article 9 was engaged because there was 'no real doubt' that the claimant's fast was intimately linked to his religious belief. 90 Moreover, Pelling QC rejected the defendant's submission that the relied on the fact that the fast was not obligatory but voluntary:
'Although the Defendant relies on the fact that the fast being undertaken by the Claimant was not obligatory but voluntary, I reject that as a relevant consideration for present purposes. There is nothing within Article 9 that requires there to be a perceived, much less an objectively demonstrable, obligation for the manifestation of religious belief to be protectable. Lord Nicholls does not suggest that to be so in . Indeed Pelling QC did not take a purely subjective approach. In reaching his conclusion that the fasting was a manifestation of his religion or belief, Pelling QC placed weight upon the fact that the claimant had been advised to embark on a three day fast by an Imam and that the Prison Imam had given evidence that "personal fasting was a recognised tenet of Islam and there was an apparently objectively good reason for the Claimant wanting to undertake such a fast": as spiritual preparation for his impending appearance at the Court of Appeal (para 20). Pelling QC"s reliance on the views of the Imam, his reference to the need for an "objectively good reason" for the manifestation of religion and his assumption of competency to assert what is and what is not "a recognised tenet of Islam" are all questionable. It seems that the High Court was seeking to determine the genuineness of Bashir"s claim contrary to the principles laid out in Williamson. However, there seems to be some contradiction in the judgment since in paragraph 18 Pelling QC held that "The Officer"s evidence is of no value in determining the genuineness of the claimant"s belief as to whether the fast could be broken". 93 arguable that it should not apply to other situations outside those regulated by a contract of employment. This seems to adopt a much narrower interpretation of the principle than we have seen in the cases above.
Further, Pelling QC also adopted a much more generous general approach to the question of interference:
"in my judgment the question of whether there has been interference becomes essentially a factual one. Having accepted that for the Claimant to embark upon and maintain a three day fast which he genuinely believed could not be broken was a manifestation of his religious beliefs, it necessarily follows that to require him to provide a sample of urine which he was not able to provide without breaking his fast was an interference with the Claimant"s Article 9 rights. Thus, I conclude that the sole issue that arises in the circumstances of this case is ... whether the interference is prescribed by law, has one of the legitimate aims identified in Article 9(2) and is proportionate".
96
This shifts the focus from the question of interference under Article 9(1) onto the question of justification under Article 9(2). Pelling QC concluded that this interference was not justified under Article 9(2) in that although the drug testing policy was "prescribed by law" and fulfilled at least one of the legitimate aims laid out in the Article, it was not proportionate.
97
There was no evidence before the Adjudicator concerning the cost or inconvenience of making appropriate adjustments in the particular circumstances that arose. 98 As Pelling QC concluded: "There was no evidence before the Adjudicator which enabled him to conclude (as apparently he did) that it was proportionate to require all Muslim prisoners engaged in personal fasting to break that fast as and when required to do so for the purposes of providing a [sample] regardless of the circumstances".
99
In the High Court 104 Lindblom J held that the City had undoubtedly established that there was a pressing social need to not to permit the camp to remain at the Cathedral and that this was in part because of the effect the occupation had on the Article 9 rights of the Cathedral: The Master of the Rolls held that neither of these arguments held sway because:
"As to (a), the Judge was plainly entitled to reach the conclusion that he arrived at. He had figures which showed a very significant reduction in worshippers at, and visitors to, the Cathedral since the Camp had arrived, and evidence of opinion from the Cathedral Registrar that the reduction was caused by the Camp. While there were some other possible explanations for the reduction, the Judge was, to put it at its lowest, entitled to reach the view that he did. As to point (b), it is true that some prominent members of the Church of England have expressed support for the Camp, but that is no answer to the Judge"s concern about the interference by the Camp with the access of people who wish to worship in the Cathedral". "Mr Bone is free to stay or leave during prayers. It is in accordance with the law. It is not discriminatory, or to the extent that it is, it is justified. I cannot see that his freedom of religion, thought or conscience is infringed by the degree of embarrassment he feels, which is no more than is inherent in the exercise by the others of their freedom to manifest their religious beliefs, and his freedom to stay 
Hotel Reservations
The Court of Appeal decision in Bull & Bull v Hall & Preddy 113 concerned discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. The religious actors, the Bulls, were the defendants not the claimants. They were hotel owners who preferred to let double accommodation to heterosexual married couples only" and so turned away a homosexual couple who had entered into a civil partnership. Rafferty LJ held that this constituted direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation because a "homosexual couple cannot comply with the restriction because each party is of the same sex and therefore cannot marry" meaning that "the criterion at the heart of the restriction, that the couple should be married, is necessarily linked to the characteristic of an heterosexual orientation" and there was therefore less favourable treatment on grounds of sexual orientation.
114
Moreover, Rafferty LJ held that this conclusion was compatible with Article 9. At first instance, Andrew Rutherford, giving the judgment of Bristol County Court held that the hotelier"s Article 9 rights had been affected. 115 However, this was justified under Article 9(2) because "in so far as the regulations [prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation] do affect this right they are ... a necessary and proportionate intervention by the state to protect the rights of others". 116 At the very least, it can be said that the treatment of Article 9 here is a little cursory. The suggestion once again that the legal requirement not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation will automatically justify religious discrimination claims.
117
However, there seems to be a welcome step away from the Begum precedent in that at least it was accepted that the religious rights were interfered with. 117 See also the cases of Ladele and Johns, discussed above.
In the Court of Appeal Rafferty LJ also concluded that: "the extent to which under the Regulations the restriction imposed by the Appellants upon the Respondents constitutes direct discrimination, and to the extent to which the Regulations limit the manifestation of the Appellants" religious beliefs, the limitations are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." 118 However, in reaching this conclusion Rafferty LJ made reference to the Article 9 case law to reach the conclusion that:
"the article did not protect hoteliers who claimed that their "religious beliefs justified their refusal to provide double beds to homosexual couples" as "the provision of hotel rooms is legal and occurs nowhere other than in an hotel", and the hoteliers could "'manifest [their] beliefs in many ways outside the commercial sphere.""
119
This would seem to be an application of the contracting out doctrine in the context of providing an answer to the question of justification under Article 9(2) (as opposed to its usual application in response to the question of interference under Article 9(1)). Whilst many objections concerning the contracting out doctrine continue to apply here, its application under Article 9(2) is preferable to its application under Article 9(1). When the rule is applied under Article 9(1) then the finding is that there has been no interference with Article 9 and so the claim is automatically dismissed. In contrast, where the rule is applied under Article 9(1) then the finding is part of the wider question of justification, allowing the merits of the case to be examined. This would therefore appear to be a step in the right direction.
Conscientious Objection
This approach was also followed in a "classic" case of where the specific situation rule would be applied. clearly applies on these facts. However, interestingly, the part of the judgment which examined the Article 9 claim considered Article 9 as a whole and did not distinguish between the questions of interference and justification. Again, in this case, the specific situation rule appears to be applied as part of the analysis of the Article 9(2) question of justification rather than the Article 9(1) question of interference:
"the fact that a person has volunteered for military service, and so voluntarily accepted the responsibilities which go with such service, may be highly material when considering the balance to be struck between the individual"s conscience and the interest of public safety, the protection of public order and the protection of the rights of others, to which article 9.2 refers". 
The Final Problem
In sum, the pattern found in the most recent case law seems to be as follows:
The most recent cases suggest that a more generous approach is beginning to be taken in respect to interference with Article 9. Bashir corrects Playfoot to confirm that non-obligatory manifestations may be protected by Article 9 and, together
with Samede (and to some extent Bideford) show a growing reluctance to rely upon the notion of voluntary submission to dismiss claims.
(ii) The decisions in Lyons, Bull & Bull and Bideford suggest that where contracting out is an issue, it will now be part of the consideration of Article 9 as a whole.
These decisions, overall, suggest that the judiciary appear to be becoming more comfortable with Article 9(1) and are more willing to consider that Article 9(1) may be engaged. However, the cursory dismissal of the Article 9 claim in Preston provides an important exception to this trend.
In short, there are tentative signs that some of the criticisms previously made of the domestic Article 9 case law are now being rectified. This is an important qualifier to a recent report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission which has identified two concerns in relation to the domestic interpretation of Article 9:
"Courts are setting too high a threshold for establishing "interference" with the right to manifest a religion or belief, and are therefore not properly addressing whether limitations on Article 9 rights are justifiable."
"Indirect discrimination provisions in domestic law covering protection for individual beliefs may not be consistent with Article 9". Taking a step backwards, the objections to the specific situation rule / contracting out doctrine highlights the main difficulty with current interpretations of religious rights. It is based upon a "binary" understanding of identity and authority. If a believer chooses to enter the public sphere then they are expected to leave their religiosity at the door of their workplace or school. There seems to be an acceptance that religious freedom is protected provided that the believer has a "right to exit" from situations where they are not permitted to manifest their religion. This term is often used in the context of concerns about discriminatory practices within religious groups. It is argued that the role of the State is simply to ensure that people have the option to leave such groups. 132 Reliance upon the "right to exit" is flawed in that that context and in the context of a believer in a secular environment.
As Phillips puts it, the "right to exit" alone is insufficient because "voice matters as well as exit. The right to leave has to be complemented by the right to stay". Shachar argues that a "new approach to multicultural accommodation must break away from the prevailing yet misleading "either your culture or your rights" ultimatum that underpins existing solutions". 139 Shachar"s solution lies in the acceptance of "joint governance" which "promises to foster ongoing interaction between different sources of authority, as a means of improving the situation of traditionally vulnerable insiders without forcing them to adhere to an either/or choice between their culture and their rights".
140
The recognition of the multi-faceted nature of identity as something which is constantly being re-negotiated and the notion that people may feel allegiance to more than one source of authority is, of course, by no means novel. However, these insights seem to have been lost in the domestic jurisprudence on Article 9 following Begum. The cases of X v Y School, Playfoot and Eweida adopted a simplistic binary understanding of the religious claims. And, although recent lower court decisions suggest that certain aspects of this case law have been corrected, the problems identified by this paper and by the Equality and Human Right
Commission have not gone away. It may well be that Strasbourg will provide some steer on these issues but only time will tell. It is crude and unhelpful to say that the juridification of religion has led to the persecution of religion; but it seems to be the case that the increase in language of religious rights has been met with signs of religious illiteracy on the part of some judges.
produced is a ghettoised pattern of social life, in which particular sorts of interest and of reasoning are tolerated as private matters but never granted legitimacy in public as part of a continuing debate about shared goods and priorities. 
